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Abstract
Using the spatial autoregressive model and spatial 
error correlation model, we have an empirical test on 
the financial competition of the 19 local governments 
in Xia Zhang Quan metropolitan area to identify the 
characteristics of “the horizontal strategic interaction” 
behavior and “the vertical common action” behavior. 
The results of our study show that the characteristics of 
interaction in the relative size of tax, the relative size of 
expenditure, the expenditure for capital construction and 
the expenditure on education of the 19 local governments 
are in the tactics of mutual mimicking. And in the 
characteristics of the vertical common action, the 19 local 
governments have followed the government of Fujian 
province in the tree policies of the relative size of tax, 
the relative size of expenditure and the expenditure on 
education. However, considering the endogencity of the 
policy of Fujian province government, “the Horizontal 
Strategic Interaction” behaviors of financial policies are 
not robust and the policy of the province government has 
stronger impact on the ones of the 19 local governments.
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INTRODUCTION AND REVIEW
Economic decentralization and political centralization 
are the basic characteristics of the Chinese economy in 
the transitional period (ZHANG, GAO, FU & ZHANG, 
2007). The competition relationship among the Chinese 
local governments occurs in the process of fiscal 
decentralization, the extent of competition is becoming 
more and more drastic since the tax sharing reform in 
1994 (CHEN, 2010). There are not only the horizontal 
strategic interaction between the same level local 
government, but also the vertical common action among 
the supervisors and subordinates levels of government. 
Effective identification of the characteristics of these 
interactive behaviors between the local governments 
becomes an important angle of the empirical study in the 
public economics. There are three types of the formation 
mechanism of strategic interactive behavior of local 
governments in theory, financial policy spillover effect 
mechanism, fiscal competition mechanism and yardstick 
competition mechanism. Driven by the development of 
related theories, there are many foreign scholars who do 
the empirical test on the horizontal strategic interaction 
behavior. Revelli (2001, 2002) does the research on the 
decision of tax rate and expenditure level among the local 
governments. Brueckner (2000), Fredriksson and Millimet 
(2002) analyze on the same issue of  standard formulation 
and regulatory way. As to the investigation of China, more 
scholars use game theory in theoritical research (ZHOU, 
2003; GUO & JIA, 2006).  
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As for the empirical study, more and more scholars 
use the spatial econometric models in this sphere, such 
as in the study of strategic interaction behaviors of tax 
policy. SHEN and FU (2006) exam the tax competition 
between the Chinese provincial governments and game 
behavior based on the cross-sectional data of inter-
provincial in 1992 and 2003. The results show that 
the slope of inter-provincial tax competition response 
function is negative, which indicating that differentiation 
is the characteristics in inter-provincial tax competition. 
In contrast to the conclusion, WANG and REN (2008) 
take empirical analysis of the instrumental variable 
method based on the 1978-2006 province level panel data. 
Their study shows that the financial strategic behavior 
among the provincial governments is significant, and 
strategic response function tilt to the right. In the study 
of strategic interaction behavior in aspects of fiscal 
expenditure, SHAO Jun’s (2007) empirical studies, that 
based on the provincial fiscal expenditure data from 2001 
to 2005, demonstrate that local fiscal expenditure have 
a significant positive external effects. Further analysis 
of the expenditure of construction and the expenditure 
on education and technology shows that there is not a 
significant strategic interaction in the expenditure on 
education and technology. LI and SHEN (2008) point out 
that the competitive strategy of provincial governments is 
extending from a simple extensive tax competition to the 
field of financial expenditure. LI and ZHOU (2009) take 
an empirical analysis of inter-provincial fiscal expenditure 
competitive behavior, using the provincial panel data from 
1999 to 2005.
In the multi-layer of governments, scholars pay 
attention to the vertical common action among upper-
tier authority and lower-tier authority. Using the spatial 
lag model, Esteller-Moré and Solé-Ollé (2001) estimate 
the reaction of U.S. state personal income and general 
sales taxes to federal tax rates, taking into account the 
special features of the U.S. tax system. The results show 
that when the federal government increases taxes, there 
is a signifcant positive response of state taxes. Revelli 
(2003) models horizontal and vertical fiscal externalities 
in a multi-tiered structure of government, and implements 
maximum likelihood and instrumental variables 
estimation techniques to identify the source of spatial 
dependence in English local government expenditures. 
The results show that when vertical fiscal externalities 
among upper-tier (County) authority and lower-tier 
(District) authority expenditures are explicitly taken 
into account, the estimated magnitude of inter-district 
fiscal interactions is substantially reduced. Devereux, 
Lockwood, and Redoano (2007) estimate equations 
informed by the theory on a panel of US state and federal 
excise taxes on cigarettes and gasoline. The results show 
that when the characteristics of the markets for the goods 
are taken into account, taxes in neighboring states have a 
significant and large effect in the case of cigarettes. In the 
case of gasoline, taxes in neighboring states do not play 
a significant role; however, there is evidence in this case 
of vertical competition. Actually, because of the political 
centralization in China, the decision-making of upper-
tier authority will have a potential and important effect 
on lower-tier authority. Based on Chinese provincial 
panel data during the period of 1985-2006, WANG, LIN, 
and YU (2010) have carried out the identification of the 
characteristics of the horizontal strategic interaction and 
the vertical common action of the local governments in 
financial competition. 
So far, the literatures on the identification of the 
behavior characteristics of the horizontal and vertical 
competition for the provincial governments tend to be 
complete, but there is not enough empirical tests on the 
level of city and county local governments. The main 
significance of this study is to investigate into the depth of 
the Xia Zhang Quan metropolitan area, at the same time 
we use the spatial autoregressive model and spatial error 
correlation model to conduct in-depth observation of the 
strategic interaction behaviors of its 19 cities and counties 
local governments in fiscal competition. Identification and 
estimation of the competitive paradigm of the financial 
competition among the local governments in Xia Zhang 
Quan has important policy implications for the promotion 
of the integrated development of this region. This study 
attempts to solve the problems as follows: For the 
horizontal strategic interaction of the financial competition, 
do the local governments in Xia Zhang Quan imitate or 
differentiate from each other? Are they consistent in tax 
policy and expenditure policy? For the vertical common 
action, do the local governments follow the government 
of Fujian province or run in the opposite direction? The 
basic structure of the article is organized as follows: This 
section is introduction and literature review. The second 
section describes the spatial econometric models and the 
variables. The third part is the explanation of the empirical 
results and the discussion of the robustness tests. The last 
part will be the conclusion and the policy suggestion. 
1 .   MODEL CONSTRUCTION AND 
VARIABLE DECLARATION
1.1  Model Selection and Construction
Following the existing literature, we choose the common 
spatial panel model which is used to identify the 
characteristics of local government finances competition’s 
strategic interaction behavior. Elhorst (2003) extends this 
model to Spatial Autoregressive Model (SAR) and Spatial 
Error Model (SEM), both of which are used in this article. 
We determine which kind of model is more suitable to Xia 
Zhang Quan metropolitan area local government financial 
competition’s strategic interaction by using the LM tests, 
goodness-of-fit and the Moran I test.
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Spatial Panel Autoregressive Model is set as follows:
1 1 1it ij jt t it t it
i j
cz w cz fc X G eρ α β η
≠
′ ′= + + + +∑  (1) 
Spatial Panel Error Model is set as follows:
2 2 2it t it t itcz fc X Gα β η ν′ ′= + + +
it ij jt it
i j
v w v uλ
≠
= +∑
it i itu ε δ= +  (2)
Where czit represents the financial policy vector of 
Xia Zhang Quan metropolitan area’s local governments i 
in year t, czjt represents the financial policy vector of Xia 
Zhang Quan metropolitan area’s local governments j in 
year t, wij is the spatial weight matrix element, which can 
be treated as the relative importance in financial policy 
decisions of local government i with respect to local 
government j, based on geographical distance. According 
to Revelli’s (2006) simple principle, when the local 
government i and local government j have a common 
geographic boundary, wij is 1, otherwise the value is 0. 
Therefore  ij jt
i j
w cz
≠
∑  represents the horizontal strategic 
interaction of local government i with respect to various 
competitive local government j. fct is Fujian provincial 
government fiscal policy variables, which is used to 
describe the vertical common action of local government 
with respect to Fujian provincial government. Xit is a set 
of control variables which reflect the characteristics of 
cities in Xia Zhang Quan metropolitan area; Gt is a set 
of control variables which reflect the macroeconomic 
situation and the Chinese-style country’s governance 
structure. Gt and fct only change over time rather than 
individual. eit and vit are random disturbance items, 
and vit obeys spatial autocorrelation form. δit is typical 
random disturbance term. εit is individual effect and it 
can be manifested as random effects or fixed effects. 
ρ, α1, β1, η1, α2, β2, η2 and λ are the parameters to be 
estimated, among which we concern most are ρ, α1, α2, 
and λ. ρ is horizontal strategic interaction parameter. If 
it is significant positive, that means, there are mutual 
imitative and comparable horizontal strategic interaction 
among the 19 local governments in Xia zhang Quan 
area. If it is significant negative, there is differentiation 
in horizontal strategic interaction among the 19 local 
governments. α1 and α2 are vertical common reaction 
parameters. If they are significant positive, it means 
that the 19 local governments are following the Fujian 
provincial government in fiscal policies-making, and 
vice versa. λ is the correlation coefficient of error space, 
the assumption of λ ≠ 0 can be tested by the Moran I 
statistic. If it is significant non-zero, it indicates that 
the interference factor does exist which causing spatial 
correlation in the spatial error model. 
1.2  Description of Data and Variables
Xia Zhang Quan metropolitan area 19 cities’ data used 
in this paper are panel data which are collected after the 
reforming of tax system since 1994. The 19 cities are 
consist of Xiamen, Quanzhou, Shishi, Jinjiang, Nan’an, 
Hui’an, Anxi. Yongchun, Dehua, Zhangzhou, Longhai, 
Yunxiao, Zhangpu, Zhao’an, Changtai, Dongshan, 
Nanjing, Pinghe and Hua’an, in which Quanzhou and 
Zhangzhou are used of the municipal district data. Data 
are derived from the “Statistical Yearbook of Fujian”, 
“Fujian Finance Yearbook”, “Countrywide City and 
County Finance Statistics Yearbook”, as well as China’s 
economic and social development of the statistical 
yearbook of China database and web database.
In order to reflect the policy orientation of the 19 
local governments in Xia Zhang Quan area, we use the 
proportion index to serve as local government fiscal 
policy variables czit, including four proportion indexes: 
the local finance income divided by GDP to measure 
the relative size of the local government tax, the local 
fiscal expenditure divided by GDP to measure the 
relative scale of local government expenditure, the Local 
expenditure for capital construction dividend by total 
local fiscal expenditure to measure the proportion of the 
expenditure of the local infrastructure, the last one is 
the local education spending divided by the total local 
fiscal expenditure to measure the proportion of education 
spending. According to the availability and comparability 
of the data, the sample periods are different. Models of 
the relative size of tax and the ones of the relative size 
of expenditure are from 1994 to 2010. Models of the 
proportion of construction expenditure are from 1994 to 
2006. Models of the proportion of education expenditure 
are from 1998 to 2010. 
The fiscal policy variable fct of Fujian provincial 
government and fiscal policy variable czit of local 
government are calculated with the same methods, 
including the relative scale of tax of Fujian province 
government and the relative scale of expenditure of 
Fujian province government, the proportion of basic 
construction expenditure of Fujian provincial government 
and the proportion of expenditure on education of Fujian 
provincial government. 
Control variable group Xit,  which reflects the 
economic and social characteristics of Xia Zhang Quan 
area, includes average wage of each city which reflects 
economic development level, and is in the natural 
logarithm. In addition, it also includes the population 
density of each city which calculated by total population 
divided by the total area, the population of pupils in total 
population which reflects the structural characteristics, the 
first industry increasing value proportion which reflects 
industrial structure characteristics and sources of richness 
of each city, the non-agricultural population proportion 
which reflects urbanization level, the proportion of staff 
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and workers in state-owned units which reflects the 
ownership structure characteristics and traffic density 
which considered by highway traffic mileage number 
divided by the total population. 
Control variable group Gt, which reflects Chinese-style 
giant governance structure and macro economy situation, 
includes decentralized finance variable which measured 
by the proportion of the tax and expenditure of the local 
governments in the one of the provincial government. And 
it also includes political centralization of state variables 
which adopts dummy form, referring to Edmark and 
Agren (2008). Promotion tournament is the governance 
characteristics of Chinese government system. Local 
governments should be responsible to higher authorities, 
not lower. It is a top-down yardstick competition based on 
the evaluation of the higher level governments (ZHANG 
& GONG, 2005). What’s more, major conference is an 
important moment during which the local officials are 
suffering appointment and removal, so the value of the 
dummy variable should be set as 1 in the year before 
major meeting: 1996, 1997, 2001, 2002, 2006 and 2007, 
in the other years the one should be set as 0. In addition, 
we use two indicators of natural logarithm: the GDP index 
and consumer price index (CPI), to reflect the macro 
economic situation of Fujian province.
2 .   E M P I R I C A L  R E S U LT S  A N D 
DISCUSSIONS ON ROBUSTNESS
Firstly, we identify the characteristics of “the horizontal 
strategic interaction” behavior and “the vertical common 
action” behavior of the financial competition of the 19 
local governments in Xia Zhang Quan metropolitan area. 
Secondly, we turn to analyze the estimation result of 
the other important control variables. Thirdly, we have 
a discussion on the results of the robustness tests. Table 
1 provides the empirical results of relative size of tax 
and relative size of expenditure. Table 2 provides the 
empirical results of expenditure for capital construction 
and expenditure on education. How to dealing with the 
endogencity of the policy of Fujian province government 
is the key problem for reliability and robustness of our 
results. The series of Model 1 that including Model 1-1 to 
Model 1-4 is different from the series of Model 2 which 
including Model 2-1 to Model 2-4. The series of Model 
2 consider the policy of Fujian province government. 
Furthermore, the series of Model 3 which including Model 
3-1, Model 3-2 and Model 3-4, introduce the dummy 
variable of centralized politics, the natural logarithm of 
GDP index of Fujian province and the natural logarithm 
of CPI of Fujian province to avoid the the endogencity 
of the policy of Fujian province government by reference 
to Hayashi and Boadway (2001). In consideration of 
Moran I test, LM-sar test, robust LM-sar test, LM-sem 
test, robust LM-sem test and goodness of fit, the series 
of Model 2 fit the real form of the behaviors of financial 
competition among the the 19 local governments in Xia 
Zhang Quan metropolitan area. Therefore, most of our 
analysis below is based on the results of the series of 
Model 2. In addition, Table 1 and Table 2 just only present 
the estimation results of SAR models and coefficient of 
spatial error term in SEM models to save the space.
Table 1  
Empirical Results of Relative Size of Tax and Relative Size of Expenditure
Relative size of tax 
(1994~2010)
Relative size of expenditure
 (1994~2010)
Model 1-1 Model 2-1 Model 3-1 Model 1-2 Model 2-2 Model 3-2
Horizontal strategic interaction 0.648973 0.590973 0.737978 0.643989
(17.61)*** (14.27)*** (24.05)*** (16.57)***
Vertical common action 0.42098 0.995872 0.606683 0.865684
(3.96)*** (4.57)*** (5.47)*** (3.37)***
Spatial error term
0.736017 0.628982 0.589986 0.329995 0.696954 0.659991
(22.25)*** (15.01)*** (13.12)*** (5.37)*** (19.27)*** (16.77)***
Average wage
(Natural logarithm)
0.000125 -0.003021 -0.006615 0.003107 -0.002753 0.011499
-0.22 (-3.21)*** (-1.82)* (4.47)*** (-2.24)** (2.05)**
Population density
-0.00001 -0.000008 -0.000007 -0.00003 -0.000028 -0.000029
(-2.87)*** (-2.32)** (-2.12)** (-6.37)*** (-6.07)*** (-6.49)***
Proportion of pupils in total population
-0.001363 -0.000655 -0.003375 -0.009076 -0.006218 -0.016465
(-0.28) (-0.13) (-0.68) (-1.35) (-0.95) (-2.47)***
Proportion of the increasing value
of the first industry
0.00783 0.003648 -0.013924 0.034482 0.035089 0.03242
-1.03 -0.48 (-1.44) (3.28)*** (3.39)*** (2.47)***
Rate of urbanization
0.004734 0.006795 0.006268 0.003094 0.000339 0.008464
-0.9 -1.27 -1.11 -0.42 -0.04 -1.09
Proportion of staff in
State-owned Units
-0.001122 0.00468 0.007705 -0.01398 -0.007058 0.008946
(-0.30) -1.16 -1.53 (-2.69)*** (-1.30) -1.33
To be continued
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Relative size of tax 
(1994~2010)
Relative size of expenditure
 (1994~2010)
Model 1-1 Model 2-1 Model 3-1 Model 1-2 Model 2-2 Model 3-2
Traffic density
0.00568 0.003273 0.002015 0.001873 -0.000795 -0.003156
(4.01)*** (2.11)** -1.18 -0.95 (-0.39) (-1.36)
Decentralized finance
1.083509 1.060189 1.176121 0.510777 0.534305 0.50333
(13.32)*** (13.28)*** (12.82)*** (7.49)*** (7.98)*** (6.97)***
Centralized politics
-0.00329 -0.00431
(-1.79)* (-1.44)
GDP index of Fujian province
(natural logarithm)
0.101371 0.261065
-1.55 (2.44)***
CPI of Fujian province
(natural logarithm)
0.001045 -0.008414
-0.03 (-0.17)
Moran I test 11.69*** 9.34*** 9.35*** 12.22*** 10.01*** 9.24***
LM-sar test 64.39*** 46.43*** Na 95.69*** 38.06*** Na
Robust LM-sar test 51.86*** 9.66*** Na 13.52*** 6.48*** Na
LM-sem test 128.42*** 79.73*** 74.68*** 140.66*** 91.85*** 72.72***
Robust LM-sem test 115.89*** 42.96*** Na 58.49*** 60.27*** Na
Hausman test -7.92 -4.94 -17.82 -6.28 -15.64 -35.02***
R2 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.92 0.92 0.87
Note. *, **, *** represent 10%, 5% and 1% level of significance respectively; t statistics are below the regression coefficients; Singnificant 
Hausman test means to use the fixed effects model, otherwise to use the random effects one; Na represents that the datum is not available. 
The notes above also apply to Table 2.    
Table 2  
Results of Expenditure for Capital Construction and Expenditure on Education
Expenditure for capital construction
(1994~2006)
Expenditure on education
(1998~2010)
Model 1-3 Model 2-3 Model 1-4 Model 2-4 Model 3-4
Horizontal strategic interaction -0.119985 0.272961 0.40595 0.337947
(-1.57) (3.91)*** (6.66)*** (5.10)***
Vertical common action
-0.081779 0.985265 1.536764
(-0.29) (3.09)*** (3.31)***
Spatial error term
-0.252999 0.273996 0.431983 0.400314 0.327995
(-2.90)*** (3.74)*** (6.78)*** (5.86)*** (4.66)***
Average wage
(Natural logarithm)
0.003056 -0.023291 -0.010745 -0.02281 -0.029094
-0.12 (-2.30)** (-1.02) (-2.07)** (-2.20)**
Population density
0.000019 -0.000125 0.000088 0.000088 0.000075
(2.98)*** (-6.73)*** (2.91)*** (2.96)*** (2.76)***
Proportion of pupils in total 
population
-0.038883 -0.015845 -0.051269 -0.030149 -0.018773
(-1.20) (-0.61) (-1.95)** (-1.11) (-0.66)
Proportion of the increasing 
value of the first industry
-0.126097 -0.096859 0.002094 0.042218 0.085651
(-4.15)*** (-2.37)*** -0.03 -0.68 -1.16
Rate of urbanization
0.066284 -0.055116 0.136909 0.108985 0.087528
(3.35)*** (-1.94)** (4.45)*** (3.39)*** (2.52)***
Proportion of staff in
State-owned Units
-0.048914 -0.042669 0.164025 0.143658 0.137902
(-2.27)** (-1.75)* (4.33)*** (3.79)*** (3.76)***
Traffic density
-0.016079 0.015811 -0.005551 -0.000622 0.00053
(-1.83)* (2.28)** (-0.63) (-0.07) -0.05
Decentralized finance
0.154825 0.553812 -1.146127 -1.181615 -1.076281
-1.57 (1.95)** (-2.63)*** (-2.74)*** (-2.51)***
Centralized politics
0.013579
(2.01)**
GDP index of Fujian province
(Natural logarithm)
-0.263502
(-0.87)
To be continued
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Expenditure for capital construction
(1994~2006)
Expenditure on education
(1998~2010)
Model 1-3 Model 2-3 Model 1-4 Model 2-4 Model 3-4
CPI of Fujian province
(Natural logarithm)
-0.126679
(-0.77)
Moran I test 0.52 0.56 6.13*** 5.38*** 5.37***
LM-sar test 0.26 0.16 26.43*** 19.89*** Na
Robust LM-sar test 0.51 0.15 0.22 0.14 Na
LM-sem test 0.06 0.04 33.39*** 24.43*** 21.19***
Robust LM-sem test 0.32 0.03 7.18*** 4.67** Na
Hausman test 49.18*** 51.36*** 73.14*** 46.07*** -20.24*
R2 0.79 0.79 0.9 0.9 0.9
Continued
2 .1   The  Ident i f ica t ion  o f  the  F inanc ia l 
Competition
It can be seen from the results of Model 2-1 in Table 1 that 
the coefficient of horizontal strategic interaction variable 
is significantly positive on the 1% level, which indicates 
that tax competition of the 19 local governments in Xia 
Zhang Quan is in the tactics of mutual mimicking since 
tax sharing reform. So do the relative size of expenditure 
and the expenditure on education, which can be seen from 
the results of Model 2-2 in Table 1 and Model 2-4 in Table 
2. As for the expenditure for capital construction, although 
it also shows a significant mimicking characteristic, it 
does not pass the series of LM tests and it is not robust 
comparing with the results of Model 1-3. The coefficient 
of horizontal strategic interaction variable in the equation 
of the relative size of expenditure is about 0.64 which is 
the highest one. The coefficient of horizontal strategic 
interaction variable in the equation of the expenditure 
on education is about 0.34 which take the second place. 
The one of the expenditure for capital construction is 
about 0.27 which is the smallest one. Thus it can be seen 
that all of the local governments in Xia Zhang Quan area 
hope to expand the size of expenditure and the 19 local 
governments keep a low level of the proportion of the 
expenditure on education in GDP and elevate the one of 
the expenditure for capital construction after the example 
of each other. However, λ is different from the coefficient 
ρ, which does not have an intuitive and direct economic 
interpretation. All the spatial panel data pass the test of 
Moran I except the data of the expenditure for capital 
construction equation which means λ≠0. And λ in all 
equations except the expenditure for capital construction 
one are significantly positive on the 1% level, which 
demonstrates that the existence of indirect effect on 
spending of non-observable variables bring about the 
spatial correlation. In short, the 19 local governments in 
Xia Zhang Quan area mimic mutually in the relative size 
of tax, the relative size of expenditure, the expenditure for 
capital construction and the expenditure on education with 
convergent characteristic.
In case of the behavior of “vertical common action”, 
the results of Model 2-1 in Table 1 show that the 
coefficient of vertical common action variable is about 
0.42 for the relative size of tax , and about 0.61 for the 
relative size of expenditure, both of which are significant 
on the 1% level. It indicates that the 19 local governments 
in Xia Zhang Quan follow the example of Fujian province 
in both of the tax policy and expenditure policy and the 
extent of following in the relative size of expenditure is 
larger. The coefficients of vertical common action for the 
expenditure for capital construction and the expenditure 
on education are -0.08 and 0.99 respectively, the former 
of which is not significant and the latter is significant on 
the 1% level. It shows that the 19 local governments in 
Xia Zhang Quan follow the example of the government of 
Fujian province in the expenditure on education but run 
counter to the province government in the expenditure 
for capital construction. In a word, the government of 
Fujian province exercises a great influence on the 19 local 
governments in Xia Zhang Quan in the making of policies 
of the relative size of tax, the relative size of expenditure 
and the expenditure on education.
2.2  Analysis of Results of Other Important 
Control Variables
Only the coefficient of the natural logarithm of average 
wage in the equation of expenditure on education is 
robust, and it is significantly negative on the 5% level 
in Model 2-4 of Table 2, indicating that the relative 
size of the expenditure on education would decrease 
when the level of average wage increases. The estimate 
coefficient of the variable of population density are 
negative significantly in the equations of the relative 
size of tax and the relative size of expenditure, and it is 
positive significantly in the equation of the expenditure 
on education, which suggesting that the local government 
with more population density prefers to put more 
favorable tax policy, smaller size of expenditure and larger 
proportion of the expenditure on education into effect. 
As for the variable of proportion of the increasing value 
of the first industry, it is not significant in the equation of 
the relative size of tax, which indicating that cities and 
LIU Shanshan; MU Lin; LIU Lingrui (2012). 
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counties that give priority to agriculture make great efforts 
to increase the size of tax. And it is positive significantly 
in the equation of the relative size of expenditure. It is 
negative significantly on the 1% level in the equation of 
the expenditure for capital construction, that is to say that 
cities and counties with higher proportion of increasing 
value of the second industry and the third industry are 
active in expanding the size of the expenditure for capital 
construction. The estimates results of rate of urbanization 
in both of the expenditure for capital construction and the 
expenditure on education equations are positive significantly 
and robust, suggesting that cities and counties with higher 
rate of urbanization are willing to expand their expenditure 
for capital construction and expenditure on education. The 
proportion of staff in state-owned units has no significant 
effect on the relative size of tax and the relative size of 
expenditure, but it has a negative effect significantly on the 
expenditure for capital construction and a positive effect 
significantly on the expenditure on education. This result is 
not the same with the research of FU and ZHANG (2007) 
which exams the erroneous tendency in the structure of 
financial expenditure among the provincial governments 
in China, indicating that the increase of the proportion of 
state-owned units in Xia Zhang Quan area has rectified the 
erroneous tendency in the structure of financial expenditure 
since tax-separating system reform. The higher proportion 
of state-owned units, the lower proportion of the expenditure 
for capital construction and the higher proportion of the 
expenditure on education.
The variable of decentralized finance has a positive 
effect significantly on the relative size of tax, the relative 
size of expenditure and the expenditure for capital 
construction, indicating that cities and counties in Xia 
Zhang Quan area prefer to increase the targets of the 
financial policies when they take more responsibility 
in them. However, it is negative significantly in the 
expenditure on education equation on the 1% level, 
suggesting that cities and counties in Xia Zhang Quan 
area with more power to make decision of the size of 
the expenditure on education decrease the size of the 
expenditure on education. As to the regression results 
of the series of Model 3, it can be seen that the variable 
of centralized politics has a negative effect significantly 
with the 10% level on the relative size of tax, no 
significant effect on the relative size of expenditure, and 
a a positive effect significantly with the 5% level on 
the expenditure on education. It is to say that the local 
governments in Xia Zhang Quan area would like to 
adopt tax preferential policy and increase the proportion 
of the expenditure on education in GDP the year before 
the important meetings.
2.3  Discussions on Robustness
More remarkable, it can be seen from the series of 
Model 1 and Model 2 in Table 1 and Table 2 that after 
considering the policy of Fujian province government, the 
degree of horizontal strategic interaction among the local 
governments drops obviously, from 0.65 to 0.59 for the 
relative size of tax, from 0.74 to 0.64 for the relative size 
of expenditure, from 0.41 to 0.34 for the proportion of 
the expenditure on education, indicating that the positive 
spatial correlations on the three financial competitions 
above in Xia Zhang Quan area mainly stem from following 
the policy of the province government, not just from 
mutual mimicing from each other. Moreover, comparing 
Model 1-1 with Model 2-1, Model 1-4 with Model 2-4 
respectively, it can be found that after considering the 
policy of Fujian province government, λ in these two 
equations decrease, but the one in the equation of the 
relative size of expenditure is the opposite. The regression 
results of the series of Model 3 which avoiding the 
endogencity of the policy of Fujian province government, 
comparing to the series of Model 2, the degree of the 
Horizontal Strategic Interaction increases a lot, from 0.42 
to 1.00for the relative size of tax, from 0.61 to 0.87 for 
the relative size of expenditure, from 0.99 to 1.54 for the 
expenditure on education. The results of Moran I test and 
series of LM tests show that only SEM models for series 
of Model 3 is significant, indicating that “the horizontal 
strategic interaction” behaviors of financial policies are 
not robust and the policy of the province government has 
stronger impact on the ones of the 19 local governments.
CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTION
Using the spatial autoregressive model and spatial 
error correlation model, we have an empirical test on the 
financial competition of the 19 local governments in Xia 
Zhang Quan metropolitan area to identify the characteristics 
of “the horizontal strategic interaction” behavior and “the 
vertical common action” behavior. The results of our study 
show that the characteristics of interaction in the relative 
size of tax, the relative size of expenditure, the expenditure 
for capital construction and the expenditure on education 
of the 19 local governments are in the tactics of mutual 
mimicking. And in the characteristics of the vertical 
common action, the 19 local governments have followed 
the government of Fujian province in the tree policies of 
the relative size of tax, the relative size of expenditure and 
the expenditure on education. However, considering the 
endogencity of the policy of Fujian province government, 
“the Horizontal Strategic Interaction” behaviors of financial 
policies are not robust and the policy of the province 
government has stronger impact on the ones of the 19 
local governments. Moreover, our study also shows that 
the increase of the proportion of state-owned units in Xia 
Zhang Quan area has rectified the erroneous tendency in 
the structure of financial expenditure since tax-separating 
system reform. The higher proportion of state-owned 
units, the lower proportion of the expenditure for capital 
construction and the higher proportion of the expenditure 
The Identification of the Financial Competition of Local Governments in Xia Zhang Quan Metropolitan 
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on education. And it is interesting that our empirical results 
indicate that the local governments in Xia Zhang Quan area 
would like to adopt tax preferential policy and increase the 
proportion of the expenditure on education in GDP the year 
before the important meetings.
Although the urban integrative construction of Xia 
Zhang Quan metropolitan area has been carried out, 
the restrictions of administrative divisions led many 
resources, policy hard to sharing, reaching an agreement 
and promoting. Based on the conclusion above, in order 
to redress Xia Zhang Quan metropolitan area’s local 
governments’ competition behavior, the process of urban 
integrative construction should be accelerated, the open 
cooperation platform should be built, adjacent cities and 
counties should break the limits of administrative division 
to realize  competition and cooperation. More importantly, 
it is very obvious that Xia Zhang Quan metropolitan 
area’s local governments are following government in 
tax expenditure and education expenditure policies. So 
the Fujian province government should take the lead 
and correctly handle interest relationship of cities and 
counties governments in Xia Zhang Quan area, overcome 
the bottleneck caused by the regional imbalance of 
interests, handle the relationship between competition and 
cooperation, making a big cake and cutting the cake. 
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